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Abstract 
The relationship between trust in representative political institutions an extra-representational 
participation (ERP) is contested. Generally, scholars have assumed that distrust is a major 
source of ERP. However, empirical studies have yielded inconclusive results. This article 
contributes to the debate by linking it to recent studies on how contextual factors affect the 
amount of ERP and interact with micro-level predictors. We take an innovative stance by 
conceptualizing the openness of political systems in both institutional and cultural terms, and 
by arguing that the negative micro-level relationship between political trust and ERP should 
be stronger in more open political systems. With a multilevel analysis of 22 European 
democracies, we show that citizens who distrust representative institutions are indeed more 
likely to engage in ERP. Most importantly, our findings indicate that the more open a political 
system in cultural terms, the stronger the negative micro-level relationship between political 
trust and ERP. 
 
Political participation, political trust, protest, political opportunity structures, social 
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Introduction 
The recent wave of protest related to the economic crisis underscores the idea that activists 
engaged in extra-representational forms of participation (ERP)1 not only raise specific 
political demands, but also criticize representative political institutions more generally. Apart 
from fighting against austerity measures, protests by the Indignados and Occupy groups 
vehemently criticize representative democracy, and call for alternative forms of democracy 
under the slogan “democracia real ya!” (real democracy now!) (della Porta and Reiter, 2012). 
Similarly, protests against infrastructure projects are often portrayed as challenges to the way 
representative democracy works. This is well illustrated by massive demonstrations and 
petitions against a new train station in the German city of Stuttgart in 2010. As an on-site 
demonstration survey shows, more than fifty percent of the respondents state democracy 
deficits as the main reason for their protest against the project (Ramid et al., 2012). 
These examples highlight that distrust in representative political institutions is often 
seen as a key source of ERP. Unsurprisingly, this micro-level relationship has been a central 
topic of political participation research since the late 1960s (e.g., Barnes and Kaase, 1979; 
Gamson, 1968; Gurr, 1970; Inglehart, 1977; Muller et al., 1982; Nilson and Nilson, 1980). 
However, scholars still disagree on how the two concepts are theoretically and empirically 
linked. In theoretical terms, the literature offers contrasting hypotheses. The standard 
approach is in line with the above mentioned examples and assumes a negative relationship 
(e.g., Dalton, 2006; Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Inglehart, 1977). It is argued that citizens who 
are disaffected with established channels of representative democracy are more likely to 
engage in protest and other forms of ERP. By doing so, citizens try to more directly intervene 
in the political process, with specific demands instead of just choosing broad ideological 
packages in elections. However, taking up the idea that citizens in established democracies are 
increasingly likely both to perceive such forms as legitimate and to take part in them, other 
  
scholars have challenged this standard assumption (e.g., Dubrow et al., 2008; Norris et al., 
2005; van Aelst and Walgrave, 2001). Unfortunately, the available empirical findings offer no 
conclusive answer since studies report negative, positive, and statistically non-significant 
effects (Norris, 2011: 223f.). 
This article attempts to shed light on this ongoing scholarly controversy by linking it to 
recent studies on how country differences both affect the overall amount of ERP and interact 
with micro-level predictors (e.g., Anderson and Mendes, 2006; Dalton et al., 2010; Dubrow et 
al., 2008; Fatke and Freitag, 2013; Marien and Christensen, 2013; Morales, 2009; Spina, 
2014; van der Meer et al., 2009; Vráblíková, 2014). As the literature on political participation 
has long suffered from an “individualistic bias” and has only recently started to systematically 
examine the impact of factors relating to the political context (Kriesi, 2008: 148), we rely on 
the political opportunity structure approach within social movement studies to come up with 
central elements of the political context faced by protesters (for a review, see Meyer, 2004). 
More specifically, we consider macro-level factors that indicate how open or accessible 
a political context is for mobilization. Thus, this article focuses on the question of how the 
micro-level association between political trust and ERP might be conditioned by the openness 
of political systems. First contributions by Dalton et al. (2010) as well as by Marien and 
Christensen (2013) suggest that the negative association between political trust and ERP 
might be stronger in closed political contexts. However, they find little support for this idea. 
That is why this article takes an innovative stance in answering the question in two ways. 
First, we introduce and empirically support the counter hypothesis, i.e., the negative micro-
level association is stronger in open political contexts. Secondly, we follow the social 
movement literature by looking at factors that indicate not only the institutional but also the 
cultural openness of political systems (see Gamson and Meyer, 1996). 
  
The article is structured as follows. The next section elaborates the micro-level 
relationship between political trust and ERP. Thereafter, we introduce the contextual level and 
discuss the expected direct and contingent effects of a political system’s openness. In the next 
section, the data, indicators, and methods are presented. We rely on data from the first five 
rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) and cover 22 European democracies. The 
subsequent section presents our empirical findings, while we conclude with a summary and 
the implications of our results. 
 
Political trust and extra-representational participation: The micro-level relationship 
For decades, scholars have adopted political distrust2 to explain why people take part in 
demonstrations and other forms of ERP (e.g., Gamson, 1968; Gurr, 1970; Muller et al., 1982). 
Norris et al. (2005: 189) have labeled this micro-level explanation “disaffected radicalism.” 
The reasoning as to why political distrust should feed ERP has changed over time, however. 
In the early 1970s, scholars like Gurr (1970) and Crozier et al. (1975) described ERP as 
rebellious behavior and a threat to political systems, whereas participation in representative 
forms was considered as a stabilizer. Since then, the idea of demonstrations, petitions, and 
boycotts as disruptive and irrational behavior has been replaced by another perspective. In this 
view, ERP is conceived as an alternative and legitimate channel for political action, i.e., as a 
more direct and issue-specific possibility for participating in the political process (e.g., 
Dalton, 2006; Inglehart, 1977). Nevertheless, citizens who are critical of political authority in 
general, and of representative democracy in particular, are still expected to be more likely to 
engage in such “elite-challenging activities” (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002: 302). 
Hypothesis 1: The less citizens trust representative political institutions, the more likely they 
are to take part in ERP. 
  
Empirically, the link between political trust and ERP has been explored in various 
studies. Contrary to the theoretical arguments, most studies have shown that taking part in 
such activities is not directly linked to political trust (for overviews, see Norris, 1999: 261ff.; 
2011: 223f.). This missing link has been revealed in various empirical studies; for example, 
early in the five-nation Political Action Study (Barnes and Kaase, 1979: 437–440), but also 
more recently in studies based on selected countries or large-scale cross-national comparisons 
(e.g., Booth and Seligson, 2005; Dalton et al., 2010; Norris et al., 2005; Schussman and 
Soule, 2005; Thomassen, 1990). Contrary to these findings, some studies have been able to 
detect a significant negative relationship between political trust and ERP (e.g., Dalton, 2004; 
Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Norris, 1999; 2011). A recent study has even found evidence for 
the counter thesis by empirically showing that political trust is positively related to ERP 
(Dubrow et al., 2008). 
To sum up, despite strong theoretical arguments that the less citizens trust political 
institutions, the more likely they are to take part in ERP, empirical studies do not offer a 
conclusive answer. In our opinion, this is mainly due to the so-far missing or underdeveloped 
embedding of this micro-level relationship into its broader political context. Dalton (2004: 
176), for example, has already pointed to the cross-national variation in this regard. While, he 
showed that, in Italy and France, political trust and ERP are positively related, a negative 
relationship was found in most other Western democracies. The following section illuminates 
in detail how this missing element might contribute to resolve the controversy. 
 
Introducing the contextual level to illuminate the micro-level relationship 
The idea that activity outside of mainstream political institutions is closely tied to its wider 
political context is far from a recent discovery. It is one of the key insights of the so-called 
“political opportunity structure approach” within social movement research. Starting with 
  
Kitschelt’s (1986) seminal study on anti-nuclear mobilization, social movement scholars have 
focused on institutional factors to assess the opportunity structure faced by challengers in a 
cross-national perspective (e.g., Hutter, 2014; Kriesi et al., 1995). 
However, empirical studies on political participation did not take particular notice of 
social movement research, and on the whole looked at micro-level factors to explain people’s 
engagement in ERP (Kriesi, 2008: 148). Admittedly, this has changed lately, since there is an 
increasing number of studies that try to explain ERP by incorporating individual and 
contextual factors. In line with social movement literature, these studies focus on the direct 
effects of institutional elements of the political context on the amount of such activities. 
Country selection determines whether the studies focus on general measures of democratic 
development (e.g., Anderson and Mendes, 2006; Dalton et al., 2010) or on specific aspects of 
the political opportunity structure faced by protesters in democracies (e.g., Dubrow et al., 
2008; Fatke and Freitag, 2013; Morales, 2009; Spina, 2014; van der Meer et al., 2009; 
Vráblíková, 2014). In general, the studies report stronger positive effects on the level of ERP 
when it comes to democratic development as compared to the variation found among 
democracies.  
Apart from this, political participation scholars have started to focus on how these 
contextual factors interact with micro-level predictors. To the best of our knowledge, only two 
studies have begun to look at how the micro-level association between political trust and ERP 
might be conditioned by its context. In their large-scale comparative study of seventy-nine 
countries, Dalton et al. (2010) expect that grievances in general, and political dissatisfaction 
more specifically, should be more important triggers of ERP in closed than in open systems. 
“In closed systems, grievances may stimulate protest because they provide the motivation to 
overcome the barriers to protest activity” (Dalton et al., 2010: 57). Empirically, they do not 
find any support for the hypothesis, as the interaction between political dissatisfaction 
  
(measured by trust in parliament) and political development (measured by the World Bank’s 
rule of law index) is not significantly related to ERP. Marien and Christensen (2013) zoom-in 
on variation among twenty-six established democracies. Again, the authors expect that 
political trust should have a stronger negative effect on ERP in closed systems: “[W]hen the 
political system makes it difficult for citizens to channel demands into the political decision-
making, the non-institutionalized activities are to a larger extent driven by distrust. 
Conversely, when the political system invites citizen input, the non-institutionalized activities 
are not to the same extent expressions of political distrust” (Marien and Christensen, 2013). 
Measuring institutional openness by the effective number of political parties and fiscal 
decentralization, as well as by a combined index of the two, their empirical findings are mixed 
at best. While the results suggest that distrust is a more important source of ERP in closed 
systems as measured by the effective number of parties, the other two measures of the 
political context do not yield significant interaction effects. 
Recapitulating these findings, we can easily see that the results are less clear than 
theoretically expected. In spite of the observable cross-national variation in the micro-level 
relationship, bringing contextual-level indicators in to enlighten the link between trust and 
ERP has not yet clarified the relationship in a satisfactory way. The crucial question is why 
the empirical evidence does not meet the theoretical expectations. In our opinion, the cited 
authors were on the right track when trying to explain the micro-level relationship through the 
lenses of cross-national variation, but the present study adds two important innovations to 
solve the puzzle. 
First, in theoretical terms, both cited studies argue that the negative effect should be 
stronger in closed political systems. By contrast, we suggest the reverse argument: the 
negative effect of trust in representative institutions on ERP should be more pronounced in 
open political contexts. In bold strokes, social movement scholars expect that open political 
  
systems encourage political mobilization in general. As Kriesi et al. (1995: 46) argue, “the 
aggregate level of mobilization increases with the weakness of the state and the inclusiveness 
of elite strategies, and will be highest where both combine.”3 In such political contexts, 
citizens have many channels through which to be heard and, therefore, ERP is more likely to 
be the terrain of those who are indeed dissatisfied with the way they can actively participate in 
these other easily accessible channels. Thus, distrust in representative political institutions 
should not be seen as a proxy for political grievances in general but as signaling a more 
specific critique of the way representative democracy works. This argument mirrors the 
general movement literature that sees grievances (in our case, distrust) as a necessary but 
insufficient condition for protest activism (see McAdam, 1982). In a closed context, with only 
few opportunities, there is only limited ERP, regardless of the level of political distrust. 
However, as opportunities for ERP increase, it is those who are dissatisfied who will act on 
the opportunities provided by the political context. 
Second, the existing studies on the political trust-ERP link emphasize institutional 
characteristics of the political context. This focus on institutional factors has been criticized in 
the social movement literature. In an influential contribution, Gamson and Meyer (1996: 287) 
argued that, “opportunity has a strong cultural component and that we miss something 
important when we limit our attention to variance in political institutions and the relationships 
among political actors.” Therefore, they urged scholars to incorporate cultural or perceived 
opportunities into their models. Thus, access seems to depend both on formal institutional 
settings and on more informal preconditions. Focusing on both sides of structural 
arrangements is a common feature of neo-institutional approaches (see, e.g., Scharpf, 1984). 
To put it differently, it is argued that not just increasing numbers or types of access options, 
which are, for example, provided by more decentralized political systems or multi-party 
systems, should be taken into account but also the way established political authorities deal 
with challenging activities and how citizens perceive the chances to influence those in power. 
  
Against this background, we argue that for a full understanding of the relationship 
between political trust and ERP, we need to rely on both institutional and cultural factors 
when referring to the openness of political systems. Building on Scharpf’s (1984) work, 
Kriesi et al. (1995: 33–37) introduced the concept of “prevailing strategies” to the study of 
social movements for getting closer to this cultural side of opportunity structures. Prevailing 
strategies refer to the kind of strategies authorities usually employ when they deal with 
challengers. Such strategies are not set in stone but they have a long history and are linked to 
the general conceptions of statehood and state-society relations prevalent in a given country. 
More specifically, Kriesi et al. distinguish between exclusive and inclusive strategies: A 
strategy of exclusion is characterized by repression and tends to lead to a polarization of 
conflicts, whereas a strategy of inclusion tries to incorporate challengers and might lead to a 
moderation of conflicts. When a strategy of inclusion prevails, political authorities are 
expected to deal more responsively with citizens’ demands and citizens should perceive that 
their political activities can make a difference. By contrast, when a strategy of exclusion 
prevails, political authorities are more insulated from citizens’ demands and, in turn, the 
citizens should perceive the authorities as less accessible.  
When it comes to our main interest, i.e., the contingent effects of a political system’s 
openness on the association between political trust and ERP, we assume that both cultural and 
institutional openness set in motion the same mechanism introduced above. In a closed 
context in institutional or cultural terms, we expect only limited ERP, regardless of the level 
of political distrust. By contrast, political systems that offer many access points, and where 
authorities facilitate the mobilization of challengers, encourage citizens’ participation in the 
political process. However, as institutional and cultural opportunities for ERP increase, we 
expect that it is those who are dissatisfied with representative institutions that will be most 
likely to act on the alternative opportunities provided by the political context. Accordingly, 
we formulate two hypotheses: 
  
Hypothesis 2a: The more open a political system in institutional terms, the stronger the 
negative micro-level relationship between political trust and ERP. 
Hypothesis 2b: The more open a political system in cultural terms, the stronger the negative 
micro-level relationship between political trust and ERP. 
 
Measurement and methods 
To test our hypotheses, we adopt a multi-level research design and rely on the European 
Social Survey (ESS). The ESS allows us to focus on contextual variation among established 
democracies and it offers sophisticated measures of our main individual-level variables 
(political trust and ERP) and many control variables. The analysis takes into account a 
maximum of 25 countries covered in the first five ESS rounds.4 Details on the phrasing of 
survey questions, their coding and descriptive statistical information are provided in the 
Online Appendix (see Table A.1, available at http://ips.sagepub.com/). 
Extra-representational participation: The main ESS questionnaire covers three ERP 
items: signing petitions, boycotting products, and taking part in lawful public demonstrations. 
Following the standard approach in the literature, we do not emphasize differences between 
these forms, but consider them as part of a common, one-dimensional action repertoire (see 
Quaranta, 2013). Therefore, our key dependent variable indicates whether respondents have 
taken part in at least one of the three activities. First, this should minimize the effects of 
specific events, since the opportunity to take part in at least one of the three activities does not 
depend as much on single campaigns (e.g., the large-scale demonstrations against the war in 
Iraq in 2003). Second, the decision is empirically supported by a factor analysis, which 
indicates that the three items load on a different factor than representational forms of 
  
participation covered by the ESS, i.e., contacting a politician, working for a political party. 
However, we cross-checked our results by relying on single items only (see below). 
Trust in representative democracy: The ESS asks for trust in different political 
institutions, e.g. trust in a country’s parliament, in politicians, in political parties, in the legal 
system, or in the police. Generally, regulatory institutions are conceived as similarly relevant 
to the political system as representative institutions. However, since the logic of our argument 
focuses on representative institutions, we rely exclusively on the key representative 
institutions of modern democracies: national parliament, politicians, and political parties. The 
question for each object of trust has been asked using a 0–10 scale with 10 indicating the 
highest level of trust. According to the established proceeding in the majority of the studies on 
political trust (see Braun, 2013: 78–83), we combined the three items into one single measure. 
Institutional context factors: Following the social movement literature, we look at the 
power dispersion within and between political institutions to get closer to the access options 
provided by the political system (see Hutter, 2014: 44–48). More specifically, we rely on 
three indicators to assess institutional openness. By doing so, we are able to cover all three 
dimensions of power dispersion identified by Vatter (2009) in his re-assessment of Lijphart 
(1999). First, we rely on Lijphart’s (1999) executives-parties dimension to assess the 
horizontal power-sharing within institutions. This index combines information on the number 
of effective parties in parliament, the absence of minimal winning and single-party majority 
cabinets, the proportionality of electoral systems (Gallagher index), and a measure for cabinet 
dominance (average cabinet duration). Second, we assess the vertical power dispersion with 
fiscal decentralization, i.e., the share of regional and local government as percentage of total 
taxation (see Morales, 2009).5 Third, we take into account direct democracy as providing 
additional access to challengers. More specifically, Hug and Tsebelis’ (2002) differentiation 
of referenda is used to construct an index. The index ranges from zero (no referenda) to four 
  
(required referenda and three types of non-required referenda available). The countries differ 
significantly on all three indicators: Switzerland turns out to be the most open or accessible 
context based on all three indicators, whereas the United Kingdom differs most in terms of 
Lijphart’s executive-party dimension and Slovenia in terms of fiscal decentralization. 
Regarding direct democracy, seven countries under scrutiny offer no such instruments at the 
national level (see Online Appendix Table A. 2, available at http://ips.sagepub.com/). 
Cultural context factors: The cultural side of political opportunities is less often 
discussed in the literature and it is harder to come up with established quantitative indicators. 
Here, we follow the literature on political culture that either relies on qualitative descriptions 
or aggregates of individual attitudes to construct indicators for cross-national research. More 
precisely, we suggest assessing the cultural (or perceived) openness of political systems with 
the help of three measures. 
To begin with, we propose relying on Jepperson’s (2002) distinction between statist and 
non-statist societies; referring to the main conception of statehood and state-society relations 
that prevails in a given country. The concept “statism” can be seen as the ideational 
supplement to the institutional state strength and comes close to the notion of prevailing 
strategies introduced before. It refers to a continuum between two ideal types: a vision of a 
centralized and totally autonomous state at one end and a totally decentralized form of 
political power within an active and organized society at the other. That is, the statist vision 
locates collective authority in a strong organizational center, whereas the non-statist vision 
locates it in society at large. Note that the distinction explicitly refers to the prevailing visions 
in a society which do not need to correspond to the state’s strength in institutional terms. For 
example, Jepperson (2002: 67) refers to the British case where centralization and high state 
capacity do not coincide with statist believes and where the development of the political 
system was not based on a “myth of the state.” 
  
To use Jepperson’s instructive distinction for quantitative research, we follow Schofer 
and Fourcade-Gourinchas’ (2001) study on associational involvement and rely on a dummy 
variable to distinguish statist from non-statist societies. France is a key example for high 
statism, as are most continental European countries with an absolutist legacy. By contrast, the 
Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries are found on the other side of the continuum 
(although they exemplify different types of non-statist societies). As shown in Table A.2, the 
UK is classified as a non-statist society but as the ‘closest’ political system in terms of 
institutional access options. The French and Italian case nicely illustrate that the institutional 
openness of a political system (rather closed in France vs. rather open in Italy) is not 
necessarily congruent with the prevailing conception of the state within the country (both 
belong to the statist group). 
In addition, we propose two attitudinal indicators based on survey data: the aggregate 
level of both party responsiveness and political trust. Since we are located now at the 
contextual level, we are not interested in each individual’s evaluation per se, but in the 
aggregate levels for each country. This aggregation of individual attitudes is the second 
approach taken by the scholarly literature to operationalize political cultures more generally, 
and it allows us to get closer to the way citizens actually perceive the openness of a political 
system more specifically. In other words, we take the level of perceptions in a society as an 
indicator for the cultural openness of the political system: higher responsiveness or trust 
indicates a more open political context. 
On the one hand, we use citizens’ evaluation of whether political parties represent their 
views well to assess the openness of representative institutions in each country. As with 
statism, this measure focuses on the way citizens perceive the responsiveness of parties and 
not on more objective institutional features such as the number of parties, which we included 
to operationalize institutional openness. On the other hand, we look at the aggregate level of 
  
political trust to capture the atmosphere of reliability in a society. By including this measure, 
we take into account both the individual-level effect of political trust and its ‘ecological’ or 
‘societal’ effect, i.e., how the social prevalence of political trust affects ERP. As Welzel and 
Deutsch (2012: 466) argue, “[a]lthough neglecting the ecological effects of values is common 
practice, it is inappropriate from both a multi-level perspective and a developmental point of 
view.” Following our theoretical argument, we expect that the aggregate level of ERP 
increases with the aggregate level of political trust, but, in contexts where representative 
political institutions are generally trusted, it is those who are more dissatisfied with these 
institutions that are most likely to act on the opportunities provided by the political context. 
Both measures vary significantly across countries. The average trust level is highest in 
Denmark (5.79 on a ten-point scale) and lowest in Bulgaria (1.93), whereas the share of 
citizens that feel well represented by a political party differs from 86.6 percent in Switzerland 
to 28.9 percent in Slovenia (see Table A.2). 
Empirically, the three indicators for cultural openness are highly, although not perfectly, 
correlated with each other. The correlation coefficient r between the aggregate level of 
responsiveness and political trust is 0.55 (p < 0.05). The respective mean values of the two 
attitudinal indicators are significantly higher for non-statist societies as compared to statist 
societies (t-test; p < 0.05).6 This suggests that all three measures tap the same underlying 
dimension of cultural openness. 
Control variables: The general aim of the individual-level analyses is to measure the 
relationship between trust in representative democracy and ERP. However, our analysis is 
aimed to control for other possible effects, in order to get an unambiguous answer. Therefore, 
we take into account the core individual-level sources of ERP as control variables: social-
structural characteristics, political involvement and political preferences (for details, see 
Online Appendix). 
  
Statistical models: Since the combination of individual and contextual indicators within 
one model can cause statistical problems (e.g., resulting in the underestimation of standard 
errors), we estimate the effects using a multilevel approach. More precisely, we estimate 
logistic multi-level models using STATA 12 to appropriately take into account the structure 
of our data since individuals are simultaneously nested in countries and time (ESS round), 
whereas the higher levels are not purely hierarchical. Methodologically speaking, our higher 
levels are non-nested or cross-classified, and our individuals are nested within this cross-
classification. To take the idiosyncratic, country-round-specific changes in the main variables 
of interest into account, we controlled in each model for the ESS round and the interaction 
between country and round. Following the logic of hierarchical modeling, we compute our 
models stepwise; starting with the empty model without any independent variables (results 
not shown). The findings show an intra-class-correlation (ICC) of .16, signifying that 16 
percent of the variance can be explained by contextual level indicators. 
 
Empirical findings 
We discuss the findings of six logistic multilevel models explaining an individual’s ERP (the 
regression tables can be found in the Online Appendix, Table A. 2, available at 
http://ips.sagepub.com/). First, we estimate the individual-level effects (Model 1a) 
independently from the contextual-level indicators, but controlling for country and time 
effects (Model 1b). Then, we enter stepwise our contextual indicators into random-intercept 
models (Models 2 to 4). Finally, Models 5 and 6 test the cross-level interaction effects to 
explore whether cultural and/or institutional context factors shape the micro-level relationship 
between political trust and ERP. For the sake of simplicity, Models 2 to 6 report the results 
based on the indices for institutional and cultural openness, but we cross-checked our results 
  
by focusing on the individual indicators separately (these results and other robustness checks 
can also be found in the Online Appendix). 
The results reported in Model 1a and Model 1b show that distrust in representative 
institutions is a source of ERP. Thus, the findings support the standard assumption found in 
the literature: the less citizens trust in representative institutions, the more likely they are to 
take part in political activities outside of institutionalized and representational channels 
(supporting Hypothesis 1). While this contrasts to studies that could not find a significant link 
between political trust and ERP (e.g., Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Booth and Seligson, 2005; 
Dalton et al., 2010; Norris et al., 2005; Schussman and Soule, 2005; Thomassen, 1990), it 
corroborates recent studies that found such a link (e.g., Hooghe and Marien, 2013; Norris, 
2011). Although these effects are not very strong, we think that the results clearly indicate that 
discontent with representative forms of democracy is a source of citizens’ engagement in 
extra-representational activities since we controlled for many alternative social-structural, 
biographical and attitudinal factors associated with participation, as well as for country and 
time effects. Furthermore, the findings for the micro-level control variables support the 
standard expectations in the scholarly literature (for details, see Online Appendix). 
Let us now turn to the direct effects of the openness of political systems on the amount 
of ERP. As shown in Table A.3 (Models 2 to 4), all significant effects support the claim that 
the amount of ERP increases with the openness of the political system. To be more precise, 
only the cultural index, but not the institutional one, turns out be significantly related to ERP. 
This is in line with the results found by other scholars who tried to assess the influence of 
institutional context factors and mostly failed to do so. Thus, it seems that it is not the 
institutional structure per se, but rather the openness as it is perceived by the citizens of the 
state that influences the amount of ERP. This underscores Gamson and Meyer’s (1996) advice 
that (social movement) scholars should focus both on institutional and on cultural elements of 
  
the political opportunity structure faced by protestors. This finding is emphasized when 
comparing the ICC of the different models. We have already mentioned that about 16 percent 
of the variance can be attributed to the original contextual level, as the empty model showed. 
This value can be reduced, generally, step by step, in each model we presented. About 2 
percent of the variance can be ascribed to the institutional factors (Model 2), but 9 percent is 
due to cultural contextual factors (Model 3). 
The findings for the single contextual indicators support the results based on the two 
combined indices (tables available from the authors). All three factors used to assess cultural 
openness significantly affect the amount of ERP, whereas this holds for only one of the three 
institutional factors. In other words, ERP is more widespread in non-statist societies, as well 
as in countries with higher aggregate levels of party responsiveness and political trust. This 
finding underscores that all three measures tap the same underlying dimension, and it also 
confirms Welzel and Deutsch’s (2012) advice to incorporate both individual-level and societal 
effects of values on ERP. By contrast, we only find such a significant effect for our measure 
of fiscal decentralization: the more decentralized a country, the higher the amount of ERP. 
Hence, only more access options along the vertical dimension seem to increase participation 
but not power-dispersion along the horizontal dimension. In contrast to Fatke and Freitag’s 
(2013) comparative study of Swiss cantons, the degree of direct democracy is also not 
significantly related to the amount of ERP in our cross-national study (see also Morales, 2009: 
202). 
What do our results tell us about the questions of whether and how the micro-level 
association between political trust and ERP is conditioned by the institutional and cultural 
openness of political systems? For this purpose, Models 5 and 6 report the interaction terms 
between the two contextual indices and trust in representative institutions. Regarding cross-
level interaction effects, we can observe a negative and significant interaction effect only on 
  
the cultural side of political opportunities: the more open a political system is in cultural 
terms, the stronger the negative micro-level association between political trust and ERP. This 
tends to support our Hypothesis 2b, but does not support Hypothesis 2a. Furthermore, the 
findings are contrary to the arguments by Dalton et al. (2010), as well as those by Marien and 
Christensen (2013), that political distrust should be a more important source of ERP in closed 
political contexts. By contrast, it supports our reasoning on the insufficient role of grievances 
(in our case, distrust in representative democracy) for explaining ERP. In closed political 
contexts, with few opportunities, there is only limited ERP, regardless of the level of political 
distrust. However, as opportunities for ERP increase, it is those who are dissatisfied who will 
act on the opportunities provided by the political context. 
Separate analyses with the single forms of ERP as dependent variable (instead of the 
combined measure) show that the same mechanism is at work, although the size of the 
interaction effect between political trust and the cultural openness of political systems is 
stronger for ‘taking part in lawful demonstrations’ and ‘signing petitions’ than for ‘boycotting 
products’. This might be explained by the fact that boycotting is often motivated by political 
consumerism and market choices which fulfill personal objects with or without further 
collective purposes (e.g., Copeland, 2014). By contrast, participation in demonstrations and 
petitions seems more motivated by the intention to affect existing political institutions and/or 
policies. 
Finally, to get closer to the size of the overall interaction effects, Figure 1 illustrates 
them graphically. The figure shows that in countries with a closed system in cultural terms, 
we find far lower levels of ERP and no pronounced differences between citizens with low and 
high levels of trust in representative institutions. In countries with higher perceived openness 
and thus culturally more open political systems, the overall amount of ERP is far higher and 
we find a strong negative relationship between political trust and ERP. While the effects are 
  
not huge, they point to a substantial and interesting difference that helps us to illuminate the 
cross-national differences in the linkage between political trust and ERP. Moreover, the 
results again underline that the political context faced by ERP should not just be modeled by 
referring to institutional factors, but that scholars should also take into account the cultural or 
perceived openness of political systems, as suggested by Gamson and Meyer (1996). 
[Figure 1] 
 
Conclusion 
This article took up the controversial debate over the relation between trust in representative 
institutions and involvement in extra-representational forms of participation (ERP). More 
precisely, we highlighted that the literature offers inconclusive empirical findings as to 
whether those citizens who distrust representative institutions are more or less likely to 
engage in ERP. We moved one step further in solving this controversy by linking it to recent 
research that deals with the questions of how contextual factors both affect the amount of ERP 
and interact with micro-level predictors To do so, we reviewed the literature on social 
movements and introduced both institutional and cultural factors that indicate the openness of 
political systems. 
Empirically, the study covered 22 established European democracies which were 
included in the first five rounds of the ESS. Relying on multilevel logistic regressions, we 
showed that people who distrust representative political institutions are indeed more likely to 
take part in petitions, public demonstrations, or boycotts (see also Hooghe and Marien, 2013; 
Norris, 2011). As we controlled for many alternative micro-level explanations, we think that 
this negative micro-level relationship indicates that discontent with representative forms of 
democracy leads people to take part in extra-representational forms of participation. 
  
More importantly, though, our results highlight that one should indeed embed this 
micro-level relationship in its broader political context. First, we showed that in culturally 
more open political contexts, citizens are more likely to engage in ERP. While the cultural or 
perceived openness of political systems is significantly related to the amount of ERP, the 
institutional openness is not. This underscores that political participation scholars should 
focus in particular on cultural or perceived elements of the context faced by protesters, as 
emphasized in the social movement literature (see Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Furthermore, 
we found that the micro-level relationship between political trust and ERP is conditioned by 
the openness of the political system: the more open a political system in cultural terms, the 
stronger the negative micro-level association between political trust and participation in such 
activities. This finding is in line with the general argument in social movement studies that 
grievances are a necessary but insufficient conditions for protest mobilization (for a classical 
statement, see McAdam, 1982). In a closed context, there is only limited ERP, regardless of 
the level of distrust. However, as opportunities for ERP increase, it is those who are 
dissatisfied with representative institutions who exploit the opportunities provided by their 
political context. 
Referring back to the examples in the introduction, our results underscore that a critique 
of representative democracy is a major source of engagement in ERP. However, such a 
critique tends to differentiate participants from non-participants far more in those democracies 
that are generally perceived as already quite open to citizens’ demands. Thus, in line with the 
idea of ‘critical citizens’ or ‘critical democrats’ (see Norris, 1999; 2011), we could interpret 
this as a sign of a vibrant and critical political scene, where those disaffected with 
representative political channels do not become apathetic but, rather, raise their voice in 
alternative, extra-representational channels. Following Qi and Shin’s (2011) dynamic model 
of democratization, the contingent effects of a political system’s openness on the association 
between political trust and ERP could even be interpreted as yet another stage in democratic 
  
development. As in earlier stages, those dissatisfied with democracy-in-practice are most 
likely to act upon the opportunities provided by the political context and their activities might 
trigger further institutional reforms. 
Future research should however rely on alternative data sources, both to better 
understand the claims made by the protestors when criticizing representative democracy (e.g., 
della Porta and Reiter, 2012; Ramid et al., 2012), as well as to answer the question of how 
(sustained) protest participation and unfulfilled expectations might influence citizens’ 
attitudes towards representative institutions. The latter type of question would require panel 
data to disentangle the complex relationship between the two micro-level concepts studied in 
this article. Another avenue for further research would be to study differences between the 
three forms of ERP more carefully. While our own results suggest that the same mechanisms 
are at work, the size of the effects seems to be differ. In addition, we could turn the research 
question around and answer what, if any, is the threshold value for cultural “closure” beyond 
which people actually start doing ERP at any cost in closed systems. In this case, one would 
probably need to focus not only on absolute values of cultural or perceived openness but also 
on relative and sudden shifts over time. Nonetheless, the present article made a start by 
looking at European democracies, and our findings urge scholars to not lose sight of the wider 
political context—and in particular its cultural side—when studying ERP. 
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Figure 1: The micro-level relationship between political trust and ERP in open and closed 
contexts 
 
Note: Marginal effects plot; the lines indicate the effect of political trust on ERP when the index of cultural 
openness is at its minimum and maximum value. 
  
  
 
                                                          
1 In this article, we rely on five waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) where citizens’ 
involvement in ERP can be operationalized as participation in boycotts, petitions, and public 
demonstrations. Scholars disagree on how to label these forms of participation. The label 
“unconventional,” as suggested by Barnes and Kaase’s (1979) path-breaking study, seems 
outdate because most of these forms are no longer seen as illegitimate by the wider public. 
Therefore, authors subsume the three forms under the labels “protest behavior” (e.g., Dalton 
et al., 2010), “non-institutionalized” (e.g., Hooghe and Marien, 2013), or “elite-challenging” 
(e.g., Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). In this article, we adopt Teorell et al.’s (2007: 340ff.) 
label by distinguishing forms of participation with respect to the main channel of expression 
(representational vs. non-representational). 
2 The concept of political trust can be defined as a positive orientation of people towards 
political objects and is based on specific standards and expectations. Thus, political trust does 
not refer to horizontal relationships between people but to vertical relationships between 
citizens of a state and their political authorities or institutions. 
3 Note that this expectation holds for moderate forms of participation, such as those covered 
in this article. Thus, the overall level of participation is expected to increase with the openness 
of the political context, while the involvement in more radical (often violent) action forms is 
expected to decrease (see also Kitschelt, 1986: 66). 
4 Although we take into account a maximum of 25 countries, the models presented in this 
article are based on 22 countries as some contextual measures were not available. However, 
we counter-checked the analyses taking into account the full number of countries when 
possible without detecting major differences in the results (see robustness checks in the 
Online Appendix, available at http://ips.sagepub.com/). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 We did not take into account Lijphart’s second federal-unitary dimension since this measure 
does not travel well to the Eastern European context. 
6 This is also confirmed by the results of the factor analysis which we used to construct a 
single composite measure for cultural openness (all three indicators load on one factor, see 
Online Appendix, available at http://ips.sagepub.com/). 
